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Abstract
We examine the impact of banking sector reforms on interest rates using bank-level data from 
Kyrgyzstan for 1998-2005. We find that increased confidence in the banking sector has 
contributed significantly to lowering interest rate levels, while the impact of lower 
intermediation costs, credit risk, and capital costs are negligible. Our results further suggest 
that the liberalization of the Kyrgyz financial sector has reduced both deposit and lending 
rates. Finally, we find that despite considerable restructuring, the Kyrgyz banking sector has 
not become more competitive. As a consequence, banks’ interest rates have not fully 
responded to lower market rates following macroeconomic stabilization. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, most countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
have pursued reforms aimed at increasing the size, stability and efficiency of their financial 
sectors. Banking supervision has been tightened with the aim of restoring confidence in the 
banking sector (Berglof and Bolton, 2002). The financial sector has been liberalized with the 
goal of inducing stronger competition and more efficient intermediation (Bonin and Wachtel, 
2003). Moreover, company and bankruptcy laws have been reformed in order to reduce credit 
risk, by facilitating transparency and contract enforcement (Pistor et al., 2000). In addition to 
these structural reforms, the stabilization of monetary and fiscal policy has created a 
macroeconomic environment which is more conducive to financial intermediation.  Recent 
data suggests that the macroeconomic and structural reforms pursued by transition countries 
have been successful in fostering financial sector development. Between 1998 and 2005 the 
ratio of private credit to GDP increased from 31% to 46% in Central and Eastern Europe, 
from 18% to 28% in Southeast Europe and from 8% to 19% in CIS countries.
1 This 
substantial deepening of the financial sector in transition countries has been accompanied by a 
marked reduction in banks' interest rates. Between 1998 and 2005 average nominal lending 
rates over all countries fell from 32.9% to 12.9%, while deposit rates dropped from 16.4% to 
5.4%. The intermediation spread of banks (lending rate minus deposit rate) has thus, on 
average, been more than halved from 16.5 to just 7.5%.   
Are these welcome developments in banks' interest rates simply a result of widespread 
macroeconomic stabilization? Or have they also been fuelled by structural reforms to the 
banking sector? Since 1998 consumer price inflation in transition countries has fallen, on 
average from 14.6% to 5.7%, suggesting that the similar reduction in nominal deposit rates 
may be purely a result of a more stable monetary policy. However, the more dramatic fall in 
lending rates, and the subsequent decline in banks' intermediation spreads, suggest that 
interest rate developments may not be entirely attributed to improved macroeconomic 
1 The figures reported in this paragraph are unweighted averages across countries based on IFS statistics. 
Regional definitions are taken from the 2006 EBRD transition report: Southeast Europe (SEE) includes Albania, 
Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and Romania. Central Eastern Europe (CEE) includes Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. We exclude Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan due to lack of 
data.    2 
stability. Existing research on financial sector development in transition countries suggests 
that structural reforms to the banking sector have been instrumental in improving the 
efficiency of financial intermediation. Examining the performance of over 500 banks in 16 
transition countries, Fries et al. (2002) find that in countries where banking sector reforms 
have been pursued more vigorously, banks earn lower interest margins. More recent research 
by Bonin et al. (2005) also find that financial liberalization has significantly improved bank 
efficiency in 11 transition countries. This result confirms the findings of Grigorian and 
Manole (2002) and Fries and Taci (2004) using similar bank-level accounting data.   
In this paper we use bank-level interest rate data to examine how banking sector reform 
has affected financial intermediation in one transition country; Kyrgyzstan. Our data captures 
the lending and deposit taking activities in local and foreign currency of all Kyrgyz banks on 
a quarterly basis from 1998 to 2005. It therefore allows us to examine the relation between 
banking sector developments and interest rates more precisely than previous studies. First, as 
we observe the actual interest rates set by banks on new loans and deposits per quarter, we 
have much more precise information on interest rates than that generated from income 
statement data in previous studies. Second, as we observe banks' interest rates for both local 
currency and foreign currency funds, we can compare interest developments which should 
depend strongly on domestic macroeconomic conditions (local currency lending and deposit 
rates) from those which should depend less on domestic macroeconomic conditions (foreign 
currency lending and deposit rates).
Kyrgyzstan is an interesting country in which to study the impact of banking sector 
reforms on financial sector development. On the one hand, Kyrgyzstan followed a structural 
reform path which is characteristic for many other transition countries. The banking sector 
was initially privatized and liberalized at a fast pace, notwithstanding a weak regulatory 
environment. After initial bank failures the sector was then restructured, and regulation 
tightened. Finally, in recent years Kyrgyzstan has seen a strong increase in foreign bank 
control. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan belongs to the low-income transition countries, for 
which there is scarce evidence on the determinants of financial sector development. Relying 
on income-statement data of banks, existing studies necessarily focus on developments in the 
more advanced European transition countries, for which this data is publicly available. The 
little evidence available for low-income transition countries suggests that banking sector 
reform may be less effective in these low-income countries. De Nicolo et al. (2003) examine    3 
intermediation spreads in CIS-7
2 countries for the period 1995-2002. They find that 
intermediation spreads are closely linked to credit risk and regulatory requirements, but that 
improvements in bank efficiency and competition have had negligible effects. Their results 
are, however, based only on a descriptive, cross-country comparison of aggregate data.  
Our descriptive data shows that, compared to other transition countries, the Kyrgyz 
banking sector has seen quite dramatic developments in nominal interest rates. The average 
lending rate in local currency was halved from 54% at the beginning of 1998 to just 26% at 
the end of 2005, while the deposit rate fell from 37% to just 8%. Comparing lending and 
deposit rates shows, however, that the intermediation spread on local currency funds has 
remained constant at 18%. Interest rates on foreign currency funds have also declined 
substantially. The interest rate on foreign currency loans has fallen from 43 to 18 percent, 
while the interest rate on deposits has fallen from 17 to 6 percent. As a result there has been a 
substantial contraction of the intermediation spread on foreign currency funds.  
Our empirical analysis suggests that increased confidence in the banking sector has 
contributed significantly to reducing the deposit rates paid by banks. In contrast, we find that 
lower credit risk, intermediation costs and capital costs have not led to lower lending rates. 
The liberalization of the Kyrgyz financial sector seems to have been beneficial to both 
depositors and borrowers. The presence of foreign controlled banks has boosted confidence in 
the banking sector, and as a consequence has reduced deposit rates. Moreover, foreign banks 
charge significantly lower lending rates than domestic banks. Our results suggest further that 
Kyrgyz lending and deposit markets are far from competitive, despite the recent restructuring 
of the sector.  Moreover, the recent reduction in banking sector concentration does not seem 
to have increased competition at all.  As a consequence, banks' interest rates have not fully 
responded to lower market rates, which have been brought about by macroeconomic 
stabilization. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 derives conditions for equilibrium interest 
rates in a dual currency economy like Kyrgyzstan. Section 3 describes our empirical 
methodology and provides descriptive statistics for our data. Section 4 presents our empirical 
results and section 5 concludes. 
2 CIS-7 countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.    4 
2. Interest rates in a dual currency banking sector 
Like in many transition and developing countries, financial intermediation in 
Kyrgyzstan is conducted not only in local currency. Nearly three-quarters of private sector 
deposits mobilized by Kyrgyz banks are denominated in foreign currency, mostly in US 
dollars. The dollarization of lending is equally high, with foreign currency credit now making 
up 70 percent of total lending. Table 1 provides an overview of financial intermediation in 
Kyrgyzstan at the end of  2005.
Table 1. Financial intermediation in Kyrgyzstan, 12/2005*
Number of Banks 20
Total deposit volume (mln. Som) 13'052
Deposits / GDP (in %) 13.0
Foreign currency deposits (in %) 73
Total credit volume (mln. Som) 7'712
Credit  / GDP (in %) 7.7
Foreign currency credit (in %) 71
Total assets of banks (mln. Som) 21'709
of which  (in %)
Customer Loans 35
Domestic Tbills  4
Foreign nostro accounts 29
* Exchange rate Som /USD in December 2005: 41.3 
With financial intermediation conducted in both local currency and foreign currency, 
how will Kyrgyz banks set interest rates? In Appendix A we provide a simple model of bank 
behavior in a two-currency financial sector. Similar to Catao (1998), we derive equilibrium 
interest rates from profit maximizing behavior of banks.
3 In this section, we present the main 
results from our theoretical model, and use them to derive an empirical strategy for our 
analysis of interest rate developments in the Kyrgyz banking sector. 
3 In contrast to Catao (1998), we do not assume that the deposit market is completely competitive. By 
introducing the domestic currency T-bill rate and the foreign currency "nostro" rate as reference interest rates for 
banks and assuming that intermediation costs for lending and deposit taking are separable, we can analyze the 
impact of competitive conditions in the deposit and credit markets separately.     5 
We consider an economy in which banks mobilize deposits from households and 
allocate their loanable funds to four types of assets: local currency treasury-bills (T-bills), 
local currency loans to domestic firms, foreign currency deposit accounts with foreign banks 
(so called "nostro" accounts"), and foreign currency loans to domestic firms. This simple 
model reflects the asset allocation of Kyrgyz banks. Table 1 shows that at the end of 2005, 
35% of consolidated banking assets were customer loans, 29% were nostro account balances, 
and 4% were domestic T-bills.   
Assuming that the interest rate for T-bills iTB, and that of nostro accounts iN*, are 
exogenous and that intermediation costs are separable, the deposit and lending markets can be 
analyzed separately. We assume tight currency exposure restrictions on banks so that the 
currency structure of assets and liabilities must be equal. Having mobilized a certain volume 
of local currency and foreign currency deposits, banks will then choose the volume of local 
currency loans so that their marginal revenue equals their exogenous revenue on local 
currency T-bills.  Banks will likewise choose the volume of foreign currency loans so that 
their marginal revenue equals their exogenous revenue on foreign currency nostro accounts. 
Defining DL (DL*) as the default probability of local (foreign) currency loans, DTB<DL as the 
domestic sovereign risk, cL (cL*) as the unit cost of underwriting these loans, and k as the unit 
cost of regulatory capital, our model yields the following equilibrium lending rates: 
[1] >@ L L TB L TB L k c i i I D D       ) (
[2] > @ * * * * * L L L N L k c i i I D     
In conditions [1] and [2] the terms in parentheses define the local currency (foreign 
currency) lending rate under perfect competition. Due to credit risk, capital costs, and 
underwriting costs, the competitive local currency lending rate will be higher than the return 
on T-bills. Likewise the competitive foreign currency lending rate will be higher than the 
return on nostro accounts. In both markets, banks charge a mark-up above the competitive 
lending rate which depends on their market power in the respective credit market (IL, I L* t
1). In our model the market power of banks is determined by concentration in the banking 
sector and the elasticity of local currency (foreign currency) credit demand.     6 
We assume that households store their savings either in cash or in bank accounts, which 
can both be held in local or foreign currency.
4 Given the deposit rates for local currency  D i
and foreign currency  * D i , a household’s choice of savings technology then depends on its 
confidence in the banking system and its confidence in the local currency. We assume for 
simplicity that all households are risk neutral and have identical expectations concerning 
exchange rate movements. As a consequence deposits will only be mobilized in both 
currencies if the difference between the local currency and the foreign currency deposit rate 
compensates for expected depreciation (or appreciation) of the local currency  e ' .
Banks mobilize savings up to the point where the marginal cost of deposit taking equals 
their marginal investment returns in either currency. Defining r as the liquidity reserve 
requirement, and cD as the unit administrative cost of deposit mobilization, we yield the 
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In conditions [3] and [4] the term in parenthesis defines the competitive interest rate on 
local (foreign) currency deposits. Condition [3] tells us that even under perfect competition 
banks will offer depositors in local currency less than the T-bill rate, due to sovereign risk, 
liquidity requirements and administrative costs of deposit mobilization. Condition [4] shows 
that households will receive less on foreign currency deposits than the "nostro" rate, due to 
liquidity requirements and administrative costs of deposit mobilization. Moreover, if banks 
have market power ( D I >1) they will further mark down deposit rates on both currencies. In 
our model the market power of banks in the deposit market again depends on the number of 
banks, and on the elasticity of deposit supply. The elasticity of deposit supply is hereby 
dependent on depositor’s confidence in the domestic banking system, which we measure with 
the indicator O. If households trust banks more, the supply of deposits is higher for each 
                                                
4 We assume, as is the case of Kyrgyzstan, that households can freely choose between deposits in foreign and 
local currency. We further assume that households cannot invest directly in government T-bills. This reflects 
reality in the Kyrgyz Republic where the majority of T-bills are held by few banks and the secondary market is 
practically inexistent.     7 
interest rate. More trust in the banking system will thus lead to a higher elasticity of deposit 
supply, ceteris paribus, and thus to lower equilibrium deposit rates. 
Concerning structural reforms to the banking sector, our theoretical model suggests that 
an increase in the trustworthiness of banks should reduce both local currency and foreign 
currency deposit rates, while a reduction of intermediation costs should raise them. Moreover, 
structural reforms which reduce credit risk, intermediation costs and capital costs will reduce 
both local currency and foreign currency lending rates. The model further predicts that banks' 
local (foreign) currency interest rates should be positively related to domestic (foreign) 
market rates. However, the reaction of banks’ interest rates to market rates (and structural 
changes) will depend on the competitiveness of the deposit and credit markets. If banks have 
no market power at all, changes in market rates will be passed on one to one. If, however, 
banks have market power, then the reaction of their interest rates will be lower. 
3. Methodology and Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly, bank-level data obtained from the National 
Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) for the period 1998-2005.
5 We conduct separate 
analysis for local and foreign currency deposit rates (Som deposits, Foreign deposits), as well 
as for local and foreign currency lending rates (Som credit, Foreign credit). As suggested by 
our theoretical model we relate banks interest rates to domestic (foreign) market rates, bank-
level indicators of trustworthiness, intermediation costs and credit risk, to prudential 
requirements on liquidity provision and capital requirements, and finally to competitive 
conditions in the banking sector. In the following we describe our dependant and explanatory 
variables in detail. Appendix B provides detailed definitions and sources for all variables. 
Banks' interest rates 
We examine mean interest rates per bank on new deposits from the private sector and 
loans to the private sector per quarter. By looking at interest rates on flows rather than stocks, 
our data more accurately reflects the current interest rate settings for each bank in each 
                                                
5 We limit our analysis to those banks which are primarily involved in financial intermediation within 
Kyrgyzstan. As a consequence we exclude the information from 2 banks from our data set.     8 
period.
6 Figure 1 plots the weighted average interest rate on new local currency deposits (Som 
deposits) and loans (Som credit) by quarter for the period 1998-2005. The picture shows two 
interesting features: First, the interest rate level for both loans and deposits has fallen 
substantially. Since 1998 lending rates have been halved from over 50% to 26%. Deposit rates 
have also dropped significantly from around 35% to just 8%. The second interesting feature 
of figure 1 is that there does not seem to have been a substantial decline in the intermediation 
spread since 1998. Indeed the spread between mean lending and deposit rates displays a 
similar level of 18% at the beginning and end of our observation period. The spread did 
experience substantial volatility between 1998 and 2002, reaching a low of -3% and a high of 
28%. Over the past three years the intermediation spread has remained stable at levels 
between 16 and 19%.
Figure 1. Interest Rates – Som
Variable definitions: See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources. Som Deposits/ Som 
Credit: weighted mean interest rate across banks per quarter. Som Spread: Som Credit – Som 



















                                                
6 Our analysis also excludes interest rates on demand deposits as complete interest rate data on these was not 
available. Robustness checks including demand deposits, based on interest rates of deposits stocks yield the 
same qualitative results.     9 
Figure 2 plots the weighted average interest rate on new foreign currency deposits 
(Foreign deposits) and loans (Foreign credit) by quarter for the period 1998-2005. The figure 
shows that foreign currency lending rates have fallen from over 40% in 1998 to 18% at the 
end of 2005. Interest rates on deposits have also decreased, but by a far lower margin. From 
an initial level of 15% they climbed shortly to 20% at the end of 1998, and have since fallen 
to roughly 6%. In contrast to local currency funds the intermediation spread on foreign 
currency funds has fallen substantially. Between 1998 and 2001 bank's intermediation spreads 
on foreign currency funds exceeded 20%. Since 2002, this spread has declined steadily to 
around 12%. Thus while the spread on foreign currency funds was substantially higher than 
that on local currency funds prior to 2000, it has now reached lower levels. 
Figure 2. Interest Rates – Foreign Currency
Variable definitions: See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources. Foreign Deposits/ 
Foreign Credit: weighted mean interest rate across banks per quarter. Foreign Spread: Foreign















Market interest rates 
Our model suggests that banks' local currency interest rates will be positively related to 
domestic market rates. Indeed, the developments in local currency deposit and lending interest 
rates, observed in Figure 1, may simply reflect the general decline in domestic market rates    10 
due to recent macroeconomic stabilization in Kyrgyzstan. At the beginning of our observation 
period in 1998 the interest rate on 3-month treasury bills of the Kyrgyz Republic stood at 
41%, as a consequence of a high government budget deficit and an inflation rate of close to 
40%. By 2005 this market rate had declined to just 4.3%, reflecting low inflation and a more 
balanced government budget. We capture the impact of domestic market rates on banks 
lending and deposit rates with the variable T-Bill rate. This captures the weighted average 
interest rate on new 3-month treasury bills in each quarter. Table 2 displays the mean value of 
T-Bill rate by year for our entire observation period.
Our model further suggests that banks' foreign currency interest rates will be positively 
related to international market rates. Indeed, international interest rate developments may 
explain the drop in interest rate levels for foreign currency deposits and loans in Kyrgyzstan. 
We capture the impact of international interest rates on Kyrgyz bank's interest rates with the 
dependent variable USD Rate. This measures the average Euro market interest rate on 3 
month US Dollar investments. Table 2 shows that USD Rate declined sharply between 2000 
and 2004, in line with the observed fall in Kyrgyz interest rates for foreign currency funds 
Table 2. Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable definitions: see Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources. All values 
reported are mean values per year based on quarterly data from sample. For reasons of 
exposition the variable Assets in table 2 reports assets valued in million 1998 Som, rather 
than the log value as used in our regression analysis. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
T Bill rate 41.2 46.7 32.4 18.2 10.8 7.1 4.9 4.3
USD rate 5.4 5.3 6.4 3.8 1.7 1.1 1.5 3.5
B a n k s 1 92 22 01 81 81 81 81 8
F o r e i g n  B a n k 13344668
S t a t e  B a n k 34433221
Assets 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.7 3.6
Substandard credit .03 .25 .09 .06 .11 .15 .08 .04
Foreign funding / Assets .05 .02 .01 .00 .01 .01 .04 .07
Liquidity reserves .16 .12 .09 .09 .10 .10 .10 .10
Capital / Loans .39 .32 .33 .54 .72 .66 .42 .38
Loans / Assets .49 .46 .45 .47 .40 .40 .50 .50
Concentration som deposits .12 .11 .12 .10 .11 .11 .11 .12
Concentration forex deposits .16 .11 .10 .12 .14 .14 .10 .09
Concentration som credit .13 .11 .10 .10 .11 .10 .10 .17
Concentration forex credit .18 .13 .12 .16 .17 .14 .14 .13   11 
Confidence in banks 
Our model suggests that stronger public confidence in the banking sector should allow 
banks to pay lower deposit rates. Indeed, De Nicolo et al. (2003) argue that a lack of trust in 
the banking sector may be the main cause of high interest rates in low-income transition 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan. We have no survey data on household confidence in the 
banking sector. We therefore include a simple indicator of trustworthiness: bank ownership.  
The dummy variable State Bank is only 1 if a bank is majority owned by the state, while the 
dummy variable Foreign Bank is only 1 if the majority of the bank's shares lie in foreign 
hands. Due to the collapse of several private domestic banks in the mid 1990's the Kyrgyz 
public may be more likely to trust state banks and foreign owned banks. If this is the case we 
should find that state-owned and foreign-owned banks can afford to pay lower interest rates 
on deposits. Table 2 shows that the share of foreign-owned institutions in the Kyrgyz banking 
sector has increased steadily since 1998, with now nearly half of all banks under foreign 
control. At the same time, the share of state-owned banks has decreased. The increased 
presence of foreign-owned banks may have contributed to higher confidence in the banking 
sector and thus lower deposit rates.
Intermediation costs and credit risk 
Our model suggests that a reduction in banks' intermediation costs should lead to higher 
deposit rates and lower lending rates for local currency and foreign currency funds. Our 
dataset does not provide us with separate information on the costs of mobilizing deposits and 
underwriting loans. As a bank-level indicator of intermediation costs we therefore use bank 
size, measured by the log of the real value of total bank Assets. Assuming that there are scale 
economies in retail banking larger banks should be able to offer lower lending rates and 
higher deposit rates than smaller banks.  
Our model suggests that a reduction in the credit risk of banks should lead to lower 
lending rates on local and domestic currency funds. Our data includes a bank level indicator 
of credit risk: the ratio of Substandard credit to total credit. The NBKR classifies loans as 
substandard if they are in arrears for more than 30 days.
7 Table 2 shows that this measure of 
credit risk has experienced strong ups and downs since 1998. The strong increase in bad loans 
                                                
7 Classification as "substandard" can also be based on prolonging of loans, changes in value of pledges among 
others.    12 
in 1999 reflects the negative effect of the Russian crisis on asset quality. The increase 
between 2001 and 2003 may reflect a more lax lending policy of banks following 
macroeconomic stabilization. More recently, the average share of substandard credit has 
decreased substantially, suggesting a strong improvement in bank portfolio quality.  
Access to international funds 
In our analysis of lending rates we further control for banks' access to international 
funding. Since 2000 Kyrgyz banks have received an increasing amount of funding from 
international financial institutions and banks. Some of this funding has been at concessional 
rates, for example for SME lending, and may therefore affect the lending rates charged by 
banks when disbursing these funds. In our estimation of lending rates we therefore include the 
variable Foreign Funds / Assets which measures the ratio of funding a bank receives from 
foreign financial institutions to its total assets. This variable allows us to analyze whether 
access to (cheaper) international funds has reduced lending rates.
Prudential Requirements 
In accordance with the Basel principles, Kyrgyz banks are subject to prudential 
requirements on capital size, capital-asset ratio, liquidity reserves, currency position, exposure 
per borrower, and concentration of deposits. Our model suggests that, in particular, 
regulations on liquidity provision and minimum capital should affect banks' deposit and 
lending deposit rates.
A reduction in regulatory requirements on liquidity reserves since 1998 may have 
affected the interest rates paid by banks to depositors. Prior to 2001 the minimum reserve 
ratio was set by the NBKR at 20 percent after which it was reduced to 10 percent. However, 
due to varying remuneration of required reserves by the NBKR, changes in the effective 
reserve rate were more frequent and more gradual. We take this into account by using the 
mean effective liquidity reserve ratio per quarter, i.e. the reserve rate adjusted for 
remuneration of reserves, as our measure of prudential liquidity requirements.
8 Table 2 shows 
that on average this variable Liquidity reserves has remained fairly constant since 2001. 
                                                
8 We use this sector level measure of liquidity requirements rather than actual liquidity position of banks as prior 
to 2002 we do not have access to the necessary balance sheet data to calculate bank-specific liquidity positions.    13 
Our model suggests that banks will charge borrowers for the opportunity cost of 
regulatory capital. An obvious indicator of capital costs would be the minimum capital/ asset 
ratio set by the NBKR. This ratio was increased from 8 to 12 percent in 1999. However, in 
practice this minimum capital ratio has not always been completely binding. Before 2001 
many banks could only gradually meet these requirements, while more recently they are 
“over-capitalized”. For this reason we use the actual ratio of Capital / Loans as our indicator 
of regulatory capital costs. We also include the bank specific ratio of Loans/Assets to control 
for differences in the asset structure across banks. Table 2 shows that the ratio of bank capital 
to loans has almost been halved since 2000, suggesting that banks are now more leveraged, 
which may have contributed to lower lending rates.  
Competition 
Our theoretical model suggests that the impact of market interest rates, intermediation 
costs, credit risk, and prudential requirements on banks' interest rates depends strongly on 
competitive conditions in the banking sector. If banks have negligible market power, changes 
in market rates, intermediation costs and liquidity requirements should be passed on to 
depositors one to one. Likewise, changes in market rates, intermediation costs, credit risk, and 
capital costs should be passed on one to one to lenders. The stronger the market power of 
banks, the weaker the reaction of their interest rates should be to our explanatory variables 
described above. Based on this theoretical result, a range of studies have judged banking 
sector competitiveness, by the reaction of deposit and lending rates in particular to changes in 
market interest rates (see Freixas and Tirole, 1998 for a discussion of such studies). We 
follow this strategy in our empirical analysis by judging the level of competitiveness in the 
Kyrgyz deposit and credit market from the reaction of banks local (foreign) currency interest  
rates to the T-Bill rate (USD rate).
In addition we directly test whether changes in banking sector competitiveness increase 
the impact of our previous explanatory variables on banks' interest rates. We do this by 
constructing a direct measure of banking sector competitiveness and interacting this with our 
measure of market interest rates. We measure the competitiveness of all four of our market 
segments (som deposits, foreign currency deposits, som credit, and foreign currency credit) 
with the variable Concentration. This measures the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
concentration for outstanding loans (deposits) in each quarter.  Table 2 shows that this 
measure of concentration is quite low for all our four market segments. With 18 banks in our    14 
sample, the minimum possible value of the HHI (indicating no market power) would be 0.06, 
while the maximum would be 1.
 9  Table 2 shows that the actual HHI for all four market 
segments lay below 0.2.  The concentration in the local currency deposit market does not 
seem to have changes much in the past five years, while that in the local currency credit 
market has actually increased. In contrast concentration in the foreign currency deposit and 
credit market has declined. 
4. Results
Tables 3-6 report OLS estimates for our four dependant variables Som deposits, Foreign
deposits, Som credit and Foreign credit respectively. In all four tables the standard errors of 
our estimated coefficients are adjusted for cluster effects at bank level. As banks’ deposit 
(lending) rates maybe affected by the maturity of their deposits (loans) all regressions control 
for the average maturity of banks' relevant liabilities (assets).
Local currency deposits 
Table 3 reports our regression results for Som deposits with column (1) displaying 
results for our baseline model. As expected, the local currency deposit rate is significantly and 
positively correlated with the T-Bill rate. Our point estimate of .563 shows, however, that 
deposit rates by no means react fully to changes in market rates. This suggests that there is 
only weak competition among banks for deposits. Further results in column (1) show that 
increased public confidence in the banking sector has contributed to lowering deposit rates. 
We expect that deposit rates are lower for state and foreign-owned banks, as depositors may 
trust these more than they do private domestic banks. Table 3 shows that foreign controlled 
banks and state controlled banks do pay significantly lower deposit rates than domestic 
private banks. The negative and significant coefficient on Assets contradicts our prediction 
that larger banks are able to pay higher deposit rates because they have lower average 
                                                
























HHI . This index takes values of 1/N (minimum concentration) to 1 (maximum concentration).    15 
intermediation costs. One explanation for the negative correlation between asset size and 
interest rates may be that bank size is not only an indicator for efficiency, but also for 
trustworthiness. Small banks may be less trustworthy, and therefore may have to pay more to 
attract deposits. The positive coefficient of Liquidity reserves contradicts our prediction that 
the (slight) reduction in effective requirements on liquidity reserves may have led to higher 
interest rates for depositors. All in all our baseline results suggest that the nominal fall in local 
currency deposit rates since 1998 has been fuelled by the decline in market interest rates, 
which reflect macroeconomic stabilization, as well as increased confidence in the banking 
sector. In contrast, the results suggest that neither lower liquidity requirements nor lower 
intermediation costs have increased the remuneration of depositors. 
Table 3. Local currency deposits 
The table reports OLS estimates for interest rates on new deposits in Kyrgyz Som using quarterly data 
for 1998-2005. See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources of all variables. Each regression 
controls for the average maturity of new deposits. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis based 
on standard errors which are adjusted for cluster effects at the bank level. One star denotes significant 
at 10% level; two stars significant at 5% level; three stars significant at 1% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  baseline  1998 - 2001  2002 - 2005  bank fixed 
effects  concentration 
T-Bill  rate  0.555 0.421 -0.002 0.529 0.321 
 (18.75)***  (10.29)***  (0.03)  (21.48)***  (3.11)*** 
Foreign  bank  -5.156  -12.347  -1.283 -6.956 -5.146 
  (4.12)*** (7.12)*** (2.53)** (3.54)*** (4.08)*** 
State  bank -2.869 -3.987 -1.969 -4.486 -2.901 
 (1.84)*  (1.91)*  (3.18)***  (1.86)*  (1.85)* 
Assets  -1.273 -0.811 -0.987 -1.139 -1.250 
 (2.32)**  (0.95)  (3.34)***  (1.76)*  (2.31)** 
Liquidity
reserves  1.073 0.998  -18.709  0.857 1.001 
  (6.14)*** (5.83)*** (5.84)*** (5.47)*** (5.77)*** 
Concentration 
* T-Bill rate       2.092 
         (2.59)** 
Constant  -3.616 3.804  188.209  4.441 -2.918 
  (1.51) (1.33)  (6.03)***  (1.38) (1.24) 
       
Observations  559 280 279 559 559 
R-squared  0.79 0.59 0.63 0.83 0.79 
Columns (2) and (3) of table 3 split our sample into the two periods 1998-2001 and 
2002-2004. This allows us to examine whether the determinants of local currency deposit 
rates have changed following the restructuring of the banking system in the aftermath of the 
Russian financial crisis. The results reported in the two tables suggest that is actually the case.    16 
The reaction of the deposit rate to changes in the T-bill rate is substantially stronger in the 
period 1998-2001 than in the period 2002-2005. Column 2 shows that in the period 1998-
2001 the strong decline in the domestic treasury bill rate (41% to 18%) had a significant 
impact on deposit rates. In contrast the low and insignificant coefficient of T-Bill rate in 
column (3) suggests that further fall in the T-bill rate from 10% to 4% between 2002 and 
2005, had no impact on deposit rates at all! These results confirm that competition in the 
Kyrgyz deposit market is weak, and if anything, the market has become less competitive over 
time. Structural differences between banks do have a significant impact on deposit rates 
between 2002 and 2005. The coefficients of Foreign bank, State bank and Assets are all 
negative and significant suggesting that more trustworthy banks were able to pay lower 
deposit rates.
Column (4) of the table examines our full data set again, but adds bank fixed effects to 
our baseline model. We introduce bank fixed effects in order to control for omitted bank-
specific characteristics which may bias our results. The results reported in column (4) confirm 
those of our baseline regression both qualitatively and quantitatively. The estimated 
coefficient for T-Bill rate is significant and similar in size to that in our baseline regression. 
Moreover, the coefficients on Foreign bank, State bank and Assets all remain negative and 
significant, supporting our baseline finding that increased trust in banks has reduced deposit 
rates.
Finally, column (5) of the table reports results of a full sample regression in which we 
include the interaction term Concentration*T-Bill rate. This specification allows us to directly 
test our theoretical prediction that the reaction of deposit rates to the T-bill rate depends on 
the level of competition between banks. If this is the case we expect a negative sign on the 
interaction term Concentration*T-Bill rate; higher concentration would imply that market rate 
changes are passed on less to depositors and borrowers. The positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term in column (5) contradicts the prediction that more 
concentration reduces the reaction of the deposit rates to market rates. An explanation for this 
result may be that our measure of concentration is a weak indicator of actual market 
competitiveness.  
Foreign currency deposits 
Table 4 presents our estimation results for Foreign deposits, displaying the same five 
specifications as in table 3. The results generally resemble those for local currency deposit    17 
rates. Foreign currency deposit rates are positively correlated with the Euro-Market USD rate, 
suggesting that international interest rate developments have contributed to lowering foreign 
currency deposit rates in Kyrgyzstan. Again though, the point estimate of .572 in our baseline 
regression suggests that the deposit market is by no means very competitive. The table further 
shows that foreign and state owned banks pay significantly lower interest rates on foreign 
currency deposits than domestic banks, while larger banks pay lower interest rates than 
smaller banks. This confirms our previous finding that more trust in foreign owned and larger 
banks may have contributed to lowering deposit rates overall. 
Table 4. Foreign currency deposits 
The table reports OLS estimates for interest rates on new deposits in foreign currency using quarterly 
data for 1998-2005. See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources of all variables. Each 
regression controls for the average maturity of new deposits. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis based on standard errors which are adjusted for cluster effects at the bank level. One star 
denotes significant at 10% level; two stars significant at 5% level; three stars significant at 1% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  baseline  1998 - 2001  2002 - 2005  bank fixed 
effects  concentration 
USD  rate  0.572 -0.001 0.548 0.486 0.224 
  (3.66)*** (0.00)  (2.43)**  (6.11)*** (0.73) 
Foreign  bank  -3.886 -7.487 -2.265 -3.233 -3.959 
  (4.43)*** (9.82)***  (1.84)*  (3.44)*** (4.63)*** 
State  bank -1.057 -1.573 -1.032 -2.398 -0.966 
 (0.61)  (0.89)  (0.40)  (2.58)**  (0.56) 
Assets  -1.040 -1.186 -0.963 -1.811 -1.112 
 (3.04)***  (2.30)**  (1.97)*  (4.93)***  (3.19)*** 
Liquidity
reserves  1.368 1.290 -1.698 1.197 1.304 
 (8.37)***  (8.52)***  (0.56)  (11.92)***  (7.78)*** 
Concentration 
* USD rate       3.194 
         (1.66) 
Constant  -7.542 -2.746 21.462 -1.526 -6.887 
 (3.82)***  (1.09)  (0.73)  (1.01)  (3.40)*** 
       
Observations  514 264 250 514 514 
R-squared  0.56 0.54 0.28 0.68 0.56 
Table 4 displays one major difference to our results for local currency deposits. Our 
sample split in columns (2) and (3) show that interest rates on foreign currency deposits are 
more closely related to international interest rates in the period after 2002 than beforehand. 
Indeed, the coefficient of USD rate in column (2) suggests that prior to 2002 there was no 
significant correlation between international interest rates and foreign currency deposit rates 
at all.  This finding stands in stark contrast to the impact of domestic T-bill rates on local    18 
currency deposit rates, where we find a stronger impact prior to 2002. One explanation is that 
during the period 1998-2001 the rates that banks had to pay for foreign currency deposit were 
influenced more by domestic instability than their potential earnings on these funds abroad. 
Lending rates 
Table 5 reports our estimation results for Som credit. As in the previous tables, we 
conduct five analyses, examining our basic model in column (1), splitting the data set in 
columns (2) and (3), introducing bank fixed-effects in column (4), and finally adding the 
interaction term of Concentration*T-Bill rate to our baseline regression in column (5). We 
find that local currency lending rates are significantly and positively correlated with the T-Bill
rate in all specifications. The point estimates of around or below .5 for T-Bill rate in all 
columns suggest, however, that lending rates have only partly reacted to falling domestic 
market rates. This result suggests that, like the deposit market, the Kyrgyz credit market is 
also characterized by weak competition. The results for our bank-level explanatory variables 
are in line with those reported for deposit rates. We find that Foreign bank and State bank
display negative signs, suggesting that lower cost of funds for more trustworthy banks does 
translate into lower lending rates. However, only the estimates for Foreign bank are 
significant. We also find a negative coefficient of Assets on lending rates suggesting that 
larger banks charge lower interest rates. This may again reflect lower funding costs of larger 
banks that may be more trustworthy. The negative coefficient on Assets would, however, also 
confirm our prediction that larger banks charge lower lending rates because they have lower 
average intermediation costs. The insignificant coefficients on Substandard credit,
Capital/Loans, and Foreign funds / Assets contradict our predictions that improved credit risk, 
lower capital costs and access to (partly subsidized) foreign funds have contributed to 
reducing local currency lending rates. Finally, the insignificant interaction term 
Concentration*T-Bill rate in column (5) suggests that recent increases in concentration in the 
local currency credit market have not affected its competitiveness.    19 
Table 5. Local currency credit
The table reports OLS estimates for interest rates on new loans in Kyrgyz Som using quarterly data 
for 1998-2005. See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources of all variables. Each regression 
controls for the average maturity of new deposits. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis based 
on standard errors which are adjusted for cluster effects at the bank level. One star denotes significant 
at 10% level; two stars significant at 5% level; three stars significant at 1% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
baseline  1998 - 2001  2002 - 2005  bank fixed 
effects  concentration 
T-Bill  rate  0.493 0.364 0.536 0.431 0.522 
  (7.55)***  (4.45)*** (1.54) (5.84)***  (3.37)*** 
Foreign  bank  -5.615  -4.076 -4.363 0.756 -5.676 
 (2.71)**  (0.59)  (2.49)**  (0.18)  (2.68)** 
State  bank -4.809 -7.557  2.262  -1.447 -4.824 
  (1.17)  (1.79)* (0.79) (0.28) (1.15) 
Assets  -2.474 -1.864 -1.355 -4.066 -2.463 
 (2.68)**  (1.05)  (2.10)*  (2.07)*  (2.65)** 
Substandard 
credit  -13.925 -13.546  0.983  -10.526 -14.037 
  (1.39) (0.71) (0.15) (1.24) (1.41) 
Capital/Loans  -0.260 -0.623 -0.212 -0.156 -0.258 
 (1.22)  (1.20)  (1.60)  (2.26)**  (1.20) 
Loans/Assets  -7.807 -9.381 -9.975 -7.427 -7.820 
 (1.28)  (0.96)  (1.88)*  (1.06)  (1.28) 
Foreign 
funds/Assets  19.386 16.883 15.842 30.777 19.290 
 (1.15)  (0.59)  (0.91)  (1.92)*  (1.13) 
Concentration 
* T-Bill rate       -0.254 
         (0.25) 
Constant  37.224 48.574 28.799 37.068 37.289 
  (8.79)*** (7.21)*** (6.25)*** (6.68)*** (8.72)*** 
          
Observations  477 243 234 477 477 
R-squared  0.53 0.27 0.24 0.68 0.53 
Table 6, finally, presents our estimation results for Foreign credit. The table displays a 
similar picture to that for local currency lending rates. Foreign currency lending rates are 
positively related to international interest rates, but point estimates of .5 and below again 
indicate weak levels of competition. Moreover, the estimates for USD rate in table 6 are of 
much weaker precision than our estimates for market rates in the previous tables. Again we 
find a significant and negative sign of Foreign bank, showing that foreign controlled banks 
charge substantially lower lending rates. This again suggests that lower finding costs for 
foreign banks, due to increased trustworthiness, have also led to lower lending rates. Also 
reflecting our results in table 5, we find that the bank-level explanatory variables Substandard
Credit, Capital / Loans and Foreign Funds / Assets are not significantly correlated with banks' 
lending rates. We find a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term    20 
Concentration*USD rate, in column (5). This result contradicts our prediction that more 
concentration in the credit market should reduce the reaction of lending rates to market rates. 
The finding thus suggests that recent reduction in concentration in the foreign currency 
lending market by no means implies that this market has become more competitive. 
Table 6. Foreign currency credit 
The table reports OLS estimates for interest rates on new loans in foreign currency using quarterly 
data for 1998-2005. See Appendix B for detailed definitions and sources of all variables. Each 
regression controls for the average maturity of new deposits. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis based on standard errors which are adjusted for cluster effects at the bank level. One star 
denotes significant at 10% level; two stars significant at 5% level; three stars significant at 1% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  baseline  1998 - 2001  2002 - 2005  bank fixed 
effects  concentration 
USD  rate  0.541 0.484 0.307 0.507 -1.155 
 (1.86)*  (0.93)  (1.03)  (1.90)*  (2.29)** 
T-Bill  rate  0.186 0.152 0.146 0.176 0.176 
  (4.76)***  (3.53)*** (1.01) (4.21)***  (4.65)*** 
Foreign  bank  -4.443 -4.231 -3.405 -4.685 -3.688 
 (3.51)***  (1.12)  (3.99)***  (2.09)**  (3.31)*** 
State  bank -2.253 -3.520 -1.729 -0.898 -2.043 
 (1.22)  (1.91)*  (2.16)**  (0.51)  (1.30) 
Assets  -2.223 -2.100 -2.317 -2.223 -2.236 
  (3.16)*** (1.54)  (5.53)*** (1.96)* (3.60)*** 
Substandard 
credit  -6.547 -4.044 -5.833 -7.427 -4.840 
 (1.68)  (0.84)  (1.71)  (1.98)*  (1.19) 
Capital/Loans  -0.149 -0.782 -0.041 -0.055 -0.190 
  (1.50) (2.02)* (0.71) (0.78) (2.21)** 
Loans/Assets  -0.934 -2.316 -1.934 -3.689 -1.499 
  (0.34) (0.42) (1.23) (1.32) (0.66) 
Foreign 
funds/Assets  7.678 23.239 -3.810 10.225 3.612 
  (0.66) (1.29) (0.95) (1.05) (0.39) 
Concentration 
* USD rate       13.896 
         (4.42)*** 
Constant  26.769 30.333 27.099 27.781 25.895 
  (17.75)*** (5.86)*** (17.61)***  (12.16)***  (18.85)*** 
       
Observations  474 240 234 474 474 
R-squared  0.55 0.29 0.55 0.64 0.59 
In all specifications of table 6 we include the domestic T-Bill rate as an explanatory 
variable of foreign currency lending rates. The domestic market rate is hereby used as an 
indicator of domestic macroeconomic conditions. We predict that foreign currency lending 
rates will be positively related to domestic macroeconomic instability, and thus to the T-Bill
rate. The reason for this is that if some borrowers of foreign currency only have income in    21 
local currency, the credit risk on foreign currency loans depends on the stability of the local 
currency. If banks think that some borrowers of foreign currency loans are unhedged, they 
will price this "currency induced" credit risk into their lending rates. Interestingly, our results 
do show a positive and highly significant relationship between the domestic T-Bill rate and 
foreign currency lending rates. This finding confirms our conjecture that recent domestic 
macroeconomic stabilization may have affected credit risk, and thus lending rates on foreign 
currency credit.  
5. Conclusions
We examine the impact of banking sector reform on interest rates in Kyrgyzstan over 
the period 1998-2005.  By relating bank-level interest rates to domestic and foreign market 
rates, as well as bank-level indicators of intermediation costs, credit risk, capital costs and 
ownership we can disentangle the impact of banking sector reform from that of the decline in 
domestic interest rates, due to macroeconomic stabilization.  
Our results suggest that increased confidence in the banking sector has contributed 
significantly to reducing banks' interest rates. In contrast, our results suggest that lower 
intermediation costs and liquidity requirements are not mirrored in higher remuneration of 
depositors. Moreover, lower bank-level credit risk, intermediation costs and capital costs have 
not significantly affected lending rates. Our results suggest that the liberalization of the 
Kyrgyz financial sector has been beneficial to depositors and borrowers. The presence of 
foreign controlled banks seems to have boosted confidence in the banking sector, and as a 
consequence has reduced deposit rates. Moreover, foreign banks charge significantly lower 
lending rates than domestic banks. Finally, our results suggest that the level of competition in 
the Kyrgyz banking sector is low, and that despite bank restructuring competition has not 
increased.  As a consequence, banks interest rates do not fully reflect lower market rates, 
which have been brought abut by macroeconomic stabilization.    22 
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Interest rates in a dual currency banking sector
The model
All quantities are noted in local currency. We deﬁne e as the local currency / foreign
currency exchange rate. An asset (liability) which is held in foreign currency and has 1
unit value of local currency at the beginning of the period (t =0 )will be worth
e1
e0 at the
end of the period (t =1 ) . If we deﬁne ¢e as the depreciation rate of the local currency
e1¡e0
e0 the end of period value of this asset can be stated as (1 + ¢e).
Thereisacontinuum ofhouseholdswith oneunit ofsavingseach. Households choose
whether to store their savings in cash or a bank account. Cash savings can be held in both
local and foreign currency currency. Bank deposits can also be made in either foreign
currency at interest rate iD¤ or local currency at interest rate iD.1 For simplicity we as-
sume that households are risk-neutral and have identical beliefs concerning the expected
depreciation of local currency ¢e. As a consequence an equilibrium where savings are
placed in both currencies can only exist if the following condition holds:2
[1] iD = iD¤ +¢ e
Households are heterogenous regarding their conﬁdence in the banking system. We
deﬁne γh as the expected loss of deposits by household h due to the risk of a bank going
bankrupt. A household h will then only make bank deposits if max(iD,i D¤ +¢e) ¸ γh.
Hereby the allocation of deposits to local currency and foreign currency is arbitrary if
condition [1] holds. In the following we consider only equilibria in which condition [1]
holds. The supply of aggregate supply of local currency deposits D and foreign currency
deposits D¤ is then given by:
[2] D + D¤ = f(iD),
∂f
∂iD > 0
There is a continuum ﬁrms, which require one unit of credit each to make an invest-
ment. Some ﬁrms have projects which requires investment in local currency and some
have projects which require investment in foreign currency. We assume that ﬁrms can
only receive loans in the currency which they need for their investments. Moreover, we
assume that the return on projects are heterogenous. Given lending rates iL for local
currency credit and iL¤ for foreign currency credit, the demand for local currency credit
credit L and foreign currency credit L¤ are then:
[3a] L = g(iL), ∂L
∂iL < 0
[3b] L¤ = g¤(iL¤),
∂g¤
∂iL¤ < 0
1We assume, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan, that households can freely choose between making deposits
in local or foreign currency. This assumption may not hold in other low-income countries where bank
charges or minimum balances may be substantially higher for foreign currency deposit accounts.
2For simplicity we ignore in the following the 2nd order interaction effect iD¢e.There arej identical banks inthemarket. All banks mobilizedeposits and invest their
loanable funds in either local currency government treasury bills (T-bills), local currency
loans, foreign currency accounts with foreign banks (so called "nostro accounts"), or
foreign currency loans. The activities of banks take place as follows:
1. In each period each bank observestheinterest rate on local currency T-billsiTBand
foreign currency "nostro" accounts iN¤. Both interest rates are taken as exogenous.
2. Each bank b simultaneously chooses a volume of local currency deposits Db and
foreign currency deposits D¤
b to mobilize, incurring an identical cost of cD per unit
mobilized.
3. Based on its mobilized deposits each bank submits liquidity reserves to the regula-
tory authorities: Rb = r(Db + D¤
b). We deﬁne r as the liquidity ratio and assume
(for simplicity) that these reserves bear no interest.
4. Each bank chooses howto allocateits loanable funds. Due to currency exposure re-
strictions local currency loanable funds (1 ¡ r)Db can only be allocated to T-bills
LTB, or local currency loans Lb.Likewise, foreign currency funds (1 ¡ r)D¤
b can
only be allocated to nostro accounts LN¤ or foreign currency loans L¤
b. All lend-
ing decisions are made simultaneously. Investments in T-bills or nostro accounts
involve no administrative costs and are not subject to prudential capital require-
ments. The underwriting and monitoring of loans incur a per unit cost of cL for
local currency loans and cL¤ for foreign currency loans. Moreover, for each unit
of credit provided to the private sector a bank must also raise k 2 [0,1) units of
capital at an opportunity cost of 1 per unit. We assume that investments in nostro
accounts are risk free, while investments in domestic T-bills are subject to a default
probability of αTB 2 (0,1). Local currency loans are subject to an (independent)
default probability of αL 2 (0,1), while foreign currency loans are subject to an
(independent) default probability of αL¤ 2 (0,1).
5. Non-performing loans are lost completely for the bank and also yield no interest
income. Performing investments are repaid, including an interest rate iL or iL¤
respectively.
6. Banks repay all deposits including interest payments iD,i D¤.3
The expected proﬁt of each bank b i sg i v e nb y:
πb =[ ( 1 ¡ αL)(1+iL) ¡ (1 + cL + k)]Lb
+[(1¡ αL¤)(1+iL¤)(1+¢e) ¡ (1 + cL¤ + k)]L¤
b
¡[iD + cD]Db ¡ [(1 + iD¤)(1+¢e) ¡ 1+cD]D¤
b
+[(1¡ αTB)(1+iTB) ¡ 1][[1¡ r]Db ¡ Lb]
+((1 + iN¤)(1+¢e) ¡ 1)[[1 ¡ r]D¤
b ¡ L¤
b]
Ignoring the interaction effects of repayment probabilities, interest and depreciation
(αLiL,α L¤iL¤,α TBiTB,α ¤¢e,iL¤¢e,iD¤¢e)) this can be simpliﬁed to:
3For simplicity we assume that bank owners have sufﬁcient wealth to cover any losses which might be
incurred by non-performing loans, and thus that they are fully liable for deposits.[5]
πb ' [iL ¡ αL ¡ cL ¡ k]Lb (i)
+[iL¤ +¢ e ¡ αL¤ ¡ cL¤ ¡ k]L¤
b (ii)
¡[iD + cD]Db ¡ [iD¤ + cD +¢ e]D¤
b (iii)
+(iTB ¡ αTB)[[1¡ r]Db ¡ Lb] (iv)
+(iN¤ +¢ e)[[1¡ r]D¤
b ¡ L¤
b] (v)
where (i) is the expected income from domestic currency loans Lb, (ii) is the ex-
pected income from foreign currency loans L¤
b; (iii)is theexpected expenses for deposits
Db,D ¤
b, (iv) is the expected income from local currency T-Bill investments, and (v) is
the income from foreign currency nostro accounts.
Due to the separability of intermediation costs we can examine bank behavior in
two steps. We ﬁrst consider the optimal allocation of a given stock of local currency
and foreign currency loanable funds. We then derive the optimal amount of funds to be
mobilized by each bank from the deposit market.
Asset choice
Consider a bank with local currency loanable funds [1 ¡ r]Db and foreign currency
loanable funds [1 ¡ r]D¤
b. Due to currency restrictions these funds must be invested in
assets of the same denomination. From [5] we see that income from buying assets with
local currency funds is given by:
[6a] πL
b =[ iL ¡ αL ¡ cL ¡ k]Lb +( iTB ¡ αTB)[[1¡ r]Db ¡ Lb]
and the income from buying assets with foreign currency funds is given by:
[6b] πL¤
b =[ iL¤ +¢ e ¡ αL¤ ¡ cL¤ ¡ k]L¤
b +( iN¤ +¢ e)[[1¡ r]D¤
b ¡ L¤
b]
The ﬁrst order conditions for maximization of [6a,6b], give us:
iL +
∂iL




b ¡ αL¤ ¡ cL¤ ¡ k = iN¤
Let us deﬁne ηL and ηL¤ as the elasticity of local currency and foreign currency credit






,we yield the following equilibrium lending rates:










The terms in parenthesis in [7a] and [7b] deﬁne the competitive interest rates in the
local (foreign) currency credit markets. In the local currency market this is given by
the opportunity cost of funds (i.e. the marginal revenue from T-bill investments) plus
administrative costs of underwriting, capital costs and a risk premium on loans above the
sovereign default rate. Thecompetitiveratein theforeign currency credit market includesthe same components except for the opportunity cost of funds which is now given by the
interest rate on nostro accounts.
In both credit markets banks will charge more than the competitive interest rate if
they have some degree of market power (φL,φ L¤ > 1). The smaller the number of banks
and the less price elastic the demand for loans, the higher this mark-up will be.
Deposit mobilization
Proﬁt maximizing deposit mobilization implies that the marginal revenue from local
currency assets equals marginal costs of local currency deposit taking and the marginal
revenue from foreign currency assets equals marginal costs of foreign currency deposit
mobilization. Given the exogenous nostro rate and (risky) T-bill rate this implies the
following two conditions:
[8a]( iTB¡ αTB)[1¡ r]=iD +
∂iD
∂DDb + cD
[8b]( iN¤ +¢ e)[1¡ r]=iD¤ +
∂iD¤
∂D¤ D¤
b + cD +¢ e
As stated above we focus our attention on interior solutions, in which both local
currency and foreign currency deposits are mobilized. This implies that households are
indifferent between local currency and foreign currency deposit making, in which case




∂D. The conditions [8a]
and [8b] can therefore be rewritten as:
[9a]( iTB¡ αTB)[1¡ r] ¡ cD = iD +
∂iD
∂DDb
[9b]( iN¤ +¢ e)[1¡ r] ¡ cD = iD +
∂iD
∂DDb
Conditions 9a and 9b allow us to deduct equilibrium conditions for the local currency
deposit rate in relation to both the local currency T-bill rate and the foreign currency




D as the elasticity of total deposit supply Given that
in a symmetrical equilibrium we have Db =
D
J we have:
iD =[ ( iTB¡ αTB)(1¡ r) ¡ cD]
1








. Then reinserting condition [1] and ignoring the 2nd order
interaction effect ¢e(1 ¡ r) 1
φD we yield:
[10a] iD =[ ( iTB¡ αTB)(1¡ r) ¡ cD] 1
φD
[10b] iD¤ =[ iN¤ (1 ¡ r) ¡ cD]
1
φD
The term in parenthesis in condition [10a] gives us the competitive interest rate for
the local currency deposit market. This is equal to banks’ risk adjusted earnings minus
regulatory and administrative costs. Likewise, the term in parenthesis in condition [10b]
gives us the competitive interest rate in the foreign currency deposit market. This is equalto banks’ risk free earnings minus regulatory and administrative costs. Both conditions
show that banks may pay less than the competitive deposit rate if they have some market
power, φD > 1.
It is important to remember that the supply of deposits is partly determined by house-
hold conﬁdence in the banking system γ. Note that at any interest rate i the elasticity of
deposit supply ηD = ∂D
∂iD
iD
D will be lower if conﬁdence in the banking system γ is higher
(because D is higher). As a consequence more conﬁdence in the banking system will
allow banks to pay less for deposits.
Closing the model
We have assumed throughout that banks take the local currency T-bill rate iTB and
the foreign currency "nostro" rate iTB as given. However, given the integrated deposit
market in our model an internal solution in which both foreign currency and local cur-
rency deposits are mobilized implies also an equalization of marginal returns in the local
currency and foreign currency asset markets. Banks will only mobilize both type of
deposits in equilibrium if their marginal revenues (adjusting for different mobilization
costs) are equal. From condition [9] we see that this implies (iTB¡ αTB)(1¡ r)¡cD =
(iN¤ +¢ e)(1¡ r) ¡ cD
or
[11] iTB = iN¤ + αTB +¢ e
Condition [11] shows that in an internal equilibrium the interest rate differential be-
tween local currency T-bills and (risk-free) foreign currency must compensate exactly for
sovereign risk of the domestic government and for currency risk of the local currency.Appendix B. Definition and sources of variables 
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Som deposits  Interest rate (in %) on new deposits in 
Kyrgyz Som per quarter. 
National Bank of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) 
Foreign deposits  Interest rate (in %) on new deposits in 
foreign currency per quarter. 
NBKR
Som credit  Interest rate (in %) on new loans in Kyrgyz 
Som per quarter. 
NBKR
Foreign credit  Interest rate (in %) on new loans in foreign 
currency per quarter. 
NBKR
T-Bill rate  Average interest rate on newly issued 3-
month treasury bills of the Kyrgyz 
government by quarter. 
NBKR
USD rate  Average euro market interest rate on 3 
month US dollar bonds by quarter. 
Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Foreign bank  Bank with at least 51% foreign ownership 
(yes/no). 
NBKR
State bank  Bank with at least 51% state ownership 
(yes/no). 
NBKR
Assets  Log of bank assets  




Ratio of substandard credit (in arrears for 
more than 30 days) to total credit 
outstanding (mean per quarter). 
NBKR
Capital / Loans  Ratio of banks capital to total customer 
loans (mean per quarter). 
NBKR
Loans / Assets  Ratio of banks customer loans to total assets 
(mean per quarter). 
NBKR
Liquidity reserves  Regulatory liquidity reserve ratio of NBKR 
adjusted for remuneration of reserves  
(mean per quarter for banking sector) 
NBKR
Foreign funds / 
Assets
Ratio of loans from international financial 
institutions or foreign banks to total assets 
(mean per bank and quarter). 
NBKR
Concentration Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index  of 
concentration of (alternatively) Som 
deposits, Som credit, foreign currency 
deposits, foreign currency credit
(mean per quarter) 
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